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Abstract:  
 
Fisheries are increasingly understood as complex adaptive systems; but the cultural, 
behavioral, and cognitive factors that explain spatial and temporal dynamics of fishing 
effort allocation remain poorly understood. Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) 
as a visualization tool, this paper combines catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) and 
ethnographic data about the Ecuadorian mangrove cockle fishery to explore patterns in 
fishing effort and the social production of fishing space. I argue that individual decisions 
about where, when, and how to fish result in spatial and temporal patterns in effort 
allocation, ultimately regulating open-access fisheries that typically operate on a first-
come, first-serve basis. These emergent patterns in the fishing effort are explained by 
individual-level preferences and adaptations; the development of knowledge and 
customary norms through the habitual use of resource space by individuals and groups; 
ecological conditions; and access. New adaptive challenges threaten to undermine such 
self-organization of open-access systems on larger spatial and temporal scales prompting 
a likely re-allocation of the fishing effort in the future.   
 
Keywords: artisanal fisheries, local ecological knowledge, decision-making, complex 
adaptive systems, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE), 
Ecuador.  
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Resumen:  
 
Las pesquerías se entienden cada vez más como sistemas adaptativos complejos; sin 
embargo los factores culturales, conductuales y cognitivos, que explican la dinámica 
espacial y temporal de la asignación de esfuerzo pesquero, siguen poco conocidos. Este 
trabajo, utiliza el Sistema de Información Geográfica (SIG) como herramienta de 
visualización, y combina la captura por unidad de esfuerzo (CPUE) y los datos 
etnográficos sobre la pesquería de concha prieta en el Ecuador, a fin de explorar la 
estructura del esfuerzo pesquero y la producción social del espacio de pesca. Esta 
investigación sostiene que las decisiones individuales acerca de dónde, cuándo y cómo 
pescar resultan en patrones espaciales y temporales de la distribución del esfuerzo, en 
última instancia, que regulan las pesquerías de acceso abierto que normalmente operan en 
base a, “quien llega primero, se sirve primero.” Estos patrones emergentes en el esfuerzo 
pesquero se explican por las preferencias y adaptaciones a nivel individual, el desarrollo 
del conocimiento y las normas consuetudinarias a través del uso habitual del espacio de 
recursos por los individuos y los grupos, las condiciones ecológicas, y el acceso. Nuevos 
desafíos adaptativos amenazan con socavar esta regulación interna de los sistemas de 
acceso libre  en las escalas espaciales y temporales más grandes. Esto puede provocar una 
probable re-asignación del esfuerzo pesquero en el futuro.  
 
Palabras claves: pesca artesanal, conocimiento local ecológico, toma de decisiones, 
sistemas adaptativos complejos, Sistemas de Información Geográfica (SIG), captura por 
unidad de esfuerzo (CPUE), Ecuador. 
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Introduction 
Coastal degradation, the decline of marine resources, and a crisis in fisheries 
management has propelled revisions in fisheries science, which currently seeks to 
understand human dimensions of environmental change, complexity, and spatial-
temporal dynamics of marine resources (St. Martin 2004; Acheson et al. 1998; Finlayson 
and McCay 1998; Wilson et al. 2013b; Wilson 2002; Mahon et al. 2008; McGoodwin 
1990). Moving beyond the simplistic bioeconometric models of conventional fisheries 
management that assume a predictable relationship between fishers and marine resources, 
current research incorporates this new focus on spatial and temporal dimensions for 
marine spatial planning and ecosystem-based management (Kaplan et al. 2010; St. 
Martin 2001; St. Martin et al. 2007).1 A large part of this paradigm shift encourages 
collaborative learning between scientists and resource users (St. Martin et al. 2007), as 
well as the incorporation of local knowledge (Aswani and Lauer 2006; García-Quijano 
2009; Valdés-Pizzini and García-Quijano 2009; Narchi et al. 2013; Berkes et al. 2000)).  
In this more holistic approach to understanding fisheries as complex adaptive 
systems, the cognitive and behavioral dimensions of fishing effort allocation remain 
poorly understood and a large source of uncertainty for fisheries management (Hilborn 
2007; Teh et al. 2012; Fulton et al. 2011; Salas and Gaertner 2004; Salas et al. 2004; 
Daw 2008; García-Quijano 2009; Guest 2003; Wilson et al. 2013b; Daw et al. 2012). 
Understanding cultural factors influencing fisher decisions about where, why, and when 
to fish could offer many insights to fishery scientists about how fishers may respond to 
changes in resource distribution caused by climate change or socio-political factors like 
the establishment of marine protected areas. As Hilborn (2007: 287) also noted, early 
work on fisheries focused narrowly on the “optimal” behavior of fishers (Gordon 1954), 
which makes marine resources susceptible to a tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). 
Anthropologists and other researchers have offered alternative explanations for human-
environment interactions drawing upon cross-cultural comparative studies of social 
organization in non-Western fishing societies (for example, see Johannes 1978; Cordell 
1974; Smith 1977; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994; McCay and Acheson 1987). Much 
previous research on folk management was less concerned with individual decision-
making and more intent on providing descriptions about how these traditional systems 
worked and their potential for self-regulation in the absence of formal mechanisms that 
aim to control fishing behavior and effort allocation. Recent studies have appropriately 
drawn attention to the vulnerability of folk management systems in the face of modernity, 
demographic change, markets, and inappropriate policies (Cinner 2005; Cinner et al. 
2007; Acheson and Brewer 2003; Dyer and McGoodwin 1994). Other recent research has 
focused on the emergence of regulatory access controls through a deliberate process of 
learning, adaptation, and self-organization (Basurto 2005, 2008; Basurto et al. 2012) and 
the effects of changing environments on fishing livelihoods and adaptations (Van Holt 
2012; Endter-Wada and Keenan 2005).         
While studies of folk management systems have deepened understanding about 
the relationship between communities and the environment, some researchers have 
questioned the assumptions about environmental stewardship since social and biological 
data have only been integrated in a handful of case studies (Berkes 2005; Pollnac and 
                                                 
1 Both citations for St. Martin provide a more thorough description and critique of bioeconometric 
modeling and maximum sustainable yield often used in conventional fisheries management. 
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Johnson 2005). The literature has also generated some debate about whether conservation 
outcomes in traditional societies are intentional or epiphenomenal (Pollnac and Johnson 
2005; Ruttan 1998; Hames 1987). Other researchers have questioned the origins of 
customary laws and whether they emerged out of a long history of co-evolution between 
maritime communities and their environments (Dyer and McGoodwin 1994) or if they 
represent a relatively recent imposition of Western conservationist values (Zerner 1994). 
As such, Pollnac and Johnson (2005) have suggested that a more vigorous investigation 
of human-environment interactions is needed to increase the credibility of social science 
contributions to fisheries science and management.  
Studies in human ecology have examined the ways in which territoriality may 
serve as an informal self-regulating mechanism in fisheries (Acheson 1975; Acheson and 
Gardner 2004, 2005; Begossi 2006; Begossi 2001; de Castro and Begossi 1996). Like 
previous anthropological work on territoriality, these theories are spatial in nature and 
give special attention to the role of resource abundance or scarcity in patterns of 
exploitation (Cashdan 1992; Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978). In addition to the ways in 
which populations of fishers respond to ecological dynamics, these studies have pointed 
to the ability of fishers to organize collectively, make decisions within technological or 
economic constraints, or practice avoidance through “niche partitioning” or mutual 
respect (Nunes et al. 2011; Begossi 2001; Acheson 1987). In other words, territoriality 
often emerges out of cooperative or competitive behaviors of individuals or groups 
(Acheson and Gardner 2004). Territorial defense has been a key concept in Acheson’s 
work on the Maine lobster fishery, in which the differential productivity of fishing 
grounds is a result of internal regulation based on fierce rivalry among groups of 
lobstermen (Acheson 1987; Acheson and Brewer 2003). Others have argued along 
similar lines that territoriality expressed through secrecy or active defense has been a way 
of controlling access to marine resources on the high seas (Durrenberger and Palsson 
1987). Begossi (2001) has documented less aggressive forms of territoriality based on 
mutual respect and reciprocity in the Atlantic Forest in Brazil. Others have observed that 
the division of fishing space is based on “niche partitioning” or the application of 
different fishing strategies under various technological constraints (Nunes et al. 2011; 
Begossi 2001).  
Alternatively, harvesters with relatively equal access to fishing space respond to 
fluctuating resource abundance through mobility and a series of individual decisions 
about where to fish. Patch choice and patch time allocation models used in human 
behavioral ecology have been powerful tools for explaining how decisions are shaped by 
resource availability, patchiness, and seasonality (Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi 
2011; Sosis 2002; Aswani 1998; Thomas 2007). As observed by Sosis (2002), fishers 
respond to environmental variability and exhibit preferences for patches with the highest 
profitable returns. They move on to the next most profitable patch when the returns fall 
below the average. As predicted by optimal foraging theory, fishers alternate fishing 
grounds based on their knowledge and experience with patch productivity on a previous 
day (Sosis 2002; Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi 2011). 
While patch-choice models suggest some degree of environmental determinism, 
Sosis’s (2002) findings raise interesting questions concerning the social production of 
fishing space. He notes, despite the high explanatory power of the patch choice model, 
his data failed to explain why two particular patches of low profitability were exploited. 
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As also once argued by Cashdan (1983), animal behavioral models often fail to capture 
the role of culture. Other researchers have argued that preferred resource spaces are based 
more on perceptions of safety, risk, and costs rather than maximizing catch rates (van 
Oostenbrugge et al. 2004; Teh et al. 2012). Moreover, while patch-choice models use 
individual-level data, the results are often aggregated to explain population trends, 
thereby obscuring important individual-level cultural nuances and losing an opportunity 
for individuals to explain their preferences in their own words.  
In this paper, I use catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE) data, Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS), and ethnographic analysis to explore cultural explanations for the patterns 
in fishing effort allocation in Ecuador’s fishery for mangrove cockles (Anadara 
tuberculosa and A. similis), bivalve mollusks gathered by artisanal fishers in coastal 
mangrove forests during low tide periods. In the last ten years, the fishery has 
experienced harvesting pressures (Mora et al. 2009, 2011). Fishing pressure has been 
further exacerbated by decades of mangrove deforestation associated with the 
unregulated expansion of shrimp aquaculture and more recent policy changes that have 
created new common property rights for local fishing associations, which now restrict 
access to areas once universally enjoyed by all cockle collectors as a public good (Beitl 
2012b; Martinez-Alier 2001). This paper is concerned with fishing effort allocation in the 
remaining open-access areas of the fishery that continue to operate on a first-come, first-
serve basis. I use GIS as a tool to visualize the fishing effort over time and space on a 
micro-scale and ethnographic data to explore how cockle fishers navigate their 
preferences for particular fishing grounds, and how such preferences develop through 
daily practice and interaction with the environment. The overall aim is to explain how 
fishing space is socially produced, adaptive challenges, and the implications for fishery 
sustainability. Responding to the “spatial turn in fisheries science” (St. Martin 2004), this 
research addresses a methodological gap in the study of folk systems (Pollnac and 
Johnson 2005) and contributes to burgeoning interest in how open-access situations do 
not always result in a tragedy of the commons (Moritz et al. 2013).   
 
Study Site  
The research reported here was carried out in Isla Costa Rica in the southern 
province of El Oro, Ecuador (Figure 1). Additional ethnographic information about the 
cockle fishery was gathered over a period of 21 months between 2006 and 2010 in the 
provinces of Esmeraldas and El Oro. The study areas have all been significantly affected 
by the conversion of coastal mangrove forests for shrimp aquaculture since the 1980s. 
The two study areas in Esmeraldas (Muisne and Las Manchas) have lost about 75% of 
their original cover, and the Archipelago Jambelí in El Oro has lost over 50% 
(CLIRSEN-PMRC 2007). Despite the significant levels of habitat degradation over the 
last several decades, mangrove cockles have maintained significant cultural and 
economic importance in each of the study areas. 
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Figure 1. Map of the study areas. This paper draws on ethnographic research conducted in the provinces of 
El Oro and Esmeraldas. Isla Costa Rica is the main study area for the analysis of the fishing effort over 
time and space. 
 
 
While all mangroves in Ecuador are considered government domain, artisanal 
fishers have ancestrally enjoyed usufruct rights to harvest resources from them. However, 
over the last several decades, shrimp farmers have exercised their political and economic 
power to exploit loopholes in laws, poor monitoring, and confusing jurisdictions of the 
coastal zone. These factors have resulted in the unregulated expansion of the shrimp 
industry over several decades. In the year 2000, the government began granting ten-year 
mangrove concessions called custodias to local fishing associations for community-based 
stewardship and sustainable use (Bravo 2007). To date, about 38,000 hectares of 
mangroves have been allocated to 41 community associations (Rosero Moya and 
Santillan Salas 2011).  
Isla Costa Rica is located on the outer edge of the Archipelago Jambelí in El Oro 
Province, a landscape dominated by shrimp farms and a complex estuarine system 
fringed with mangrove stands. Located about 45 minutes in motor-powered boat from the 
Port of Hualtaco and another 15 minutes by bus from the city of Huaquillas on the 
Peruvian border, Isla Costa Rica’s 300 inhabitants depend primarily on mangrove 
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resources for their livelihoods. Like other communities in El Oro, men and boys have 
traditionally harvested cockles for subsistence and markets (INP 1971), in contrast to 
Esmeraldas Province where, until recently, cockle collecting has been predominantly 
associated with women and children (Ocampo-Thomason 2006; Mera Orcés 1999). Some 
families practice cockle mariculture by storing small shells below the market size in 
mangrove enclosures located directly in front of their homes. There are two local fishing 
associations. One, whose constituents are primarily cockle collectors and their wives, is 
in charge of a custodia. 
As one of the first recipients of a custodia, the Asociación Isla Costa Rica has 
successfully managed their 519 hectare concession since the year 2000 (Bravo and 
Altamirano 2006; Beitl 2011). As such, Isla Costa Rica reflects a mixed property system, 
in which all four property arrangements highlighted in the commons literature are present 
(see Ostrom et al. 1999): 1) public/ government (all mangrove, beach, and waterways); 2) 
private (shrimp farm concessions); 3) common property (custodia of the Association Isla 
Costa Rica); and 4) open-access (all gathering grounds outside the custodia shared with 
fishers from adjacent communities) (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2: Mixed “property” arrangements include: 1) Government (mangrove, beach, and waterways); 2) 
private (shrimp farm concessions); 3) common property (fishery areas within a community concession 
utilized exclusively by residents of Isla Costa Rica; 4) open-access (all fishery areas not delineated by the 
boundaries of a concession by which all fishers share usufruct rights). 
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Based on local ecological knowledge, experience with the productivity of fishing 
grounds, as well as biological knowledge presented in workshops by external 
organizations, the association has designated certain cockle beds within their custodia for 
periodic closures: Chanchos, Diluvio, Costa Rica, Cemeterio, Jesus Maria, and Manoas. 
Other parts of the custodia and open-access areas are harvested daily. The fishery-
managed areas are harvested for ten days after 30-day closure periods, with the exception 
of Manoas harvested every Saturday. The managed areas function much like the common 
property regimes described by Ostrom (1990) with locally designed rules, monitoring, 
sanctioning, and a rotating guard system by members of the association to prevent access 
by outsiders (Beitl 2011).2 During the early years, the Asociación Isla Costa Rica actively 
defended its custodia against cockle collectors from Puerto Hualtaco most likely 
harvesting their own ancestral gathering grounds around the neighboring community of 
San Gregorio, which was abandoned in the 1950s due to subsidence. Today, fishers from 
Hualtaco and Isla Costa Rica share open-access space. While many cockle collectors 
from Hualtaco respect the boundaries of Isla Costa Rica’s custodia, they continue to 
occasionally face violent confrontations with the proprietors of other newly established 
concessions throughout the archipelago (Beitl 2012b).  
 
Methods  
The micro-scale analysis of fishing effort allocation in Isla Costa Rica draws on 
CPUE data gathered by the association from January 15 to June 30, 2010 as part of our 
agreement for a community monitoring project. 3  Similar to the concept of “return rates” 
used in optimal foraging theory for its ability to estimate relative resource abundance 
(Aswani 1998), CPUE is a measure of the density of the population size of a target 
species used by fishery scientists to assess stocks. According to the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, “large CPUEs indicate large populations since many 
individuals are caught for every unit of fishing effort” (NOAA n.d.). The National 
Fisheries Institute (INP) in Ecuador, a public research institution, defines CPUE as the 
average number of shells per unit of effort, where each unit of effort refers to each 
fisher’s trip.  
To document and explore preferences in fishing space, we began with exploratory 
fisher diaries (n=10). From March to April 2009, each participant kept a daily record of 
the number of shells and names of the sites, among other information. These preliminary 
results were shared and discussed in two separate focus groups to gain understanding 
about who decides to go where and why. The exploratory diaries and focus groups also 
provided substantial background information that aided in the design of a semi-structured 
interview questionnaire (Weller and Romney 1988; Johnson 1998), which was 
administered in all four study areas. Using an Etrex Vista Global Positioning System 
(GPS) we mapped the location of the gathering grounds during high tide.4 The map was 
later verified by the ten fisher diary participants.  
                                                 
2 For a more detailed description of characteristics of common property regimes, see Ostrom (1990). 
3 Per our agreement, these data are now the intellectual property of the Asociación Costa Rica and future 
research using this dataset should note the appropriate citation (Asociación de Mariscadores Pescadores 
Artesanales y Afines "Costa Rica" 2010).  
4 All points were marked at the entrance to small creeks more accessible by motor-powered boat during 
high tide.  
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The idea for the community monitoring project grew out of conversations with 
Adolfo Cruz, the president of the association (Beitl and Cruz 2010). One field assistant 
collected daily CPUE data from 27 participants over 166 days (excluding Sundays and 
holidays), resulting in 2,160 observations from 60 different gathering grounds. The 
participants included members of the association, their sons, and two members from the 
island’s other fishing association, representing about half of the estimated number of 
cockle fishers in the village. Participants provided information about the site of 
extraction, CPUE, the number of hours worked, number of shells used for personal 
consumption or mariculture, number left in the mangrove, the number sold, and their 
alternative activity if they did not go cockle collecting. In addition to CPUE data, the 
field assistant documented the total fishing effort each day by counting the number of 
fishermen from March to June.  
I entered all the CPUE data into an Excel spreadsheet and exported it to SPSS 
17.0 for cross-tabulation of fisher by fishing ground to create a pivot table. The table was 
joined with GPS points in GIS to create a new layer file capable of depicting the intensity 
of individual effort by site over time. To further prepare the data for analysis, I divided 
the fishing grounds into four major zones (Figure 2):  1) sites around San Gregorio (Zone 
1); 2) sites around Chelén Estuary often referred to as “aquí atrás” or “right here behind” 
the community (Zone 2); 3) the area of the custodia harvested on a daily basis called 
Sector Corazones (Zone 3); and 4) the fishery-managed areas of the custodia harvested 
for ten days after 30-day closure periods.  I used analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) to 
compare differences in CPUE between the four zones.  
The ethnographic analysis draws on semi-structured interviews (n=146), 
observations, participant observation, and focus groups (n=7) in all four study areas. In 
Isla Costa Rica, field assistants and key informants often helped with participant 
recruitment (n=58).5 In Puerto Hualtaco, cockle buyers, field assistants, and occasionally 
INP biologists helped randomly select individuals as they disembarked from the boats 
returning from fishing trips as the tide was rising (n=33).6 In Muisne, my field assistant 
and I randomly recruited informants from our boat in the middle of the estuary at the end 
of the low tide period, offering refreshments and to tow people’s canoes into port in 
exchange for their participation (n=47). In the village of Las Manchas, my field assistant 
and I recruited informants during five separate visits (n=8). The general questionnaire 
was divided into four sections including 1) information about the catch, fishing grounds, 
and activity of cockle collecting; 2) baseline demographic information; 3) perceptions 
about change in mangroves and the cockle fishery; and 4) participation in civil society, 
collective action, and other livelihood strategies (see Beitl 2012a). Two questions from 
the general questionnaire were particularly relevant for this portion of the research: the 
name of each informant’s favorite gathering ground(s) and reasons for their preference(s). 
In each of the focus groups (n=7), three to 25 participants helped me further understand 
how people choose certain fishing areas. Moreover, I gained much understanding by 
participant observation in cockle collecting in all four study areas. The ethnographic data 
were used to interpret and contextualize the spatial patterns in the fishing effort revealed 
by GIS.  
 
                                                 
5 23 of those 58 interviewees also participated in the community monitoring project. 
6 Out of the 36 recruited in Puerto Hualtaco, only three declined to participate. 
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Results 
Table 1 registers the names of the 60 gathering grounds divided into four zones in 
Isla Costa Rica. The table includes information about average CPUE at each site, total 
number of trips (fishing effort), distance from the community, and the number of times 
that site was cited in an interview as “preferred” by cockle fishers from Isla Costa Rica 
and Hualtaco. The mean catch is 79 shells per unit of effort (n=2,160) with significant 
differences between the four zones (ANOVA: F = 35.90; df = 3; p = 0.000; n = 2,146).7 
Encenada (Zone 3) is the most popular site with the highest frequency of trips, followed 
by three gathering grounds in the managed areas of the custodia, and finally, San 
Gregorio (Zone 1). The most frequented site in Zone 2 is Chelén. Interestingly, less 
popular sites in Zone 2 along the Chupadores Estuary were cited as preferred spots by 
about one-third of the cockle fishers interviewed in Hualtaco (n=33). 
 
Table 1. Names and characteristics of all gathering grounds frequented by residents of Isla Costa 
Rica from Jan – Jun 2010.  
GATHERING 
GROUNDS 
Mean CPUE (number of shells 
per unit of fishing effort, or 
trip) 
Total 
Number of 
Trips 
Distance from 
Community (km) 
Number of times cited 
in interviews as 
“preferred” 
 Mean CPUE Std. Deviation    
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Grounds in Zone 1: Areas around San Gregorio    
Barquillo 69 41.89 5 2.533 1 (CR), 1(H) 
Cabos 63 10.79 7 2.404 1 (CR) 
Huevito 71 24.55 77 2.896 2 (CR) 
San Gregorio 71 23.67 146 2.407 4 (CR), 1 (H) 
Silverio * 118 60.1 2   
Total Zone 1 71 24.64 237   
Grounds in Zone 2: Areas near the Community and "Aquí Atrás"  
Buenos Aires  62 7.21 3 3.476  
Cambise 77 43.78 18 2.531 1 (CR) 
Canalete 63 17.31 21 2.4  
Canto * 57 19.57 30   
Canton * 45 21.21 2   
Chelen 58 25.46 71 2.164 3 (CR) 
Chucha 97 12.37 7 2.558  
Chupadores 53 26.3 4 3.949 3 (CR), 13 (H) 
Cruce Chupador 110 . 1 5.183  
Guato 77 27.19 61 2.13 1 (CR) 
Juanillos * 50 14.14 2  1 (CR) 
La Zora 60 17.32 3 2.084  
Manoas 65 21.56 45 0.964  
Mejillon 40 14.14 2 3.292  
Mero 87 23.83 7 3.566  
                                                 
7 Note that trips with incomplete information were dropped from the analysis of CPUE by zone.  
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Murcielago 80 . 1 1.683  
Palo Caido 48 18.11 8 2.532  
Pancho * 74 35.27 6 2.614  
Pato 63 33.18 31 2.405  
Raya 75 . 1 3.705  
Tumba Rel 115 49.5 2 2.791  
Vial * 100 . 1 0.89  
500 Lisas    3.136 1 (CR), 1(H) 
Pampita * 78 . 1 1.274 1 (CR) 
Piedredo * 145 . 1   
Sango * 101 20.51 2   
Sanja * 75 . 1   
Sortija * 28 . 1   
Vacon * 82 . 1   
Total Zone 2 67 28.59 330   
Grounds in Zone 3: "Sector Corazones"    
Arenal 80 21.07 44 5.331  
Casas 81 22.87 143 5.864 5 (CR) 
Corral 84 24.17 95 5.908 2 (CR) 
Cruce de Corazones 149 68.49 5 5.964 6 (CR) 
Cuchillo 100 . 1 5.196 2 (CR) 
Encenada 79 27.71 451 5.149 16 (CR) 
Pato Corazones * 63 30.55 3   
Peligro 75 . 1   
Perro 79 32.38 21 4.689 2 (CR) 
Varadero 225 . 1 6.916  
Ballena    6.781 2 (CR) 
Cogollo * 48 3.54 2   
Desague * 75 . 1   
Lagarto * 80 . 1   
Llanto 150 . 1 7.538 1 (CR), 1(H) 
Total Zone 3 81 27.6 770   
Fishery-Managed Areas of the Custodia    
Cemeterio 111 38.19 22 2.646  
Chanchos 100 34.7 330 1.396 1 (CR) 
Costa Rica  72 27.19 178 0.1619  
Diluvio 74 27.02 270 1.223 1 (CR) 
Jesus Maria 75 26.71 10 1.981  
Total Managed Areas 85 33.64 810   
Unknown Locations      
Cruce * 103 16.43 5   
El Cruce * 65 25 3   
Gabino * 140 . 1   
Toldo * 80 . 1   
Marranco *     1 (CR) 
Total (all sites) 79 31.15 2160   
______________________________________________________________________ 
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Caption: * Table includes: average catch-per-unit effort (CPUE) and fishing effort (total trips), distance 
from community, and the number of times each site was mentioned as a preferred spot during the 
interviews in Isla Costa Rica (CR, n=58) and Hualtaco (H, n=33). * denotes the coordinates were not 
mapped with a GPS.  
 
Figure 3 depicts aggregations of fishing effort allocation during two phases, 
illustrating the movement of fishers in response to rules of their common property 
arrangements. Figure 3a depicts the closure periods for managed areas and Figure 3b 
illustrates the open periods. The larger circles indicate a higher number of fishing trips. 
Figure 3a further suggests that fishing effort is higher in Zone 3, an area also associated 
with a higher CPUE (Table 1).  
 
3a. 
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3b. 
 
Figure 3. Fishing effort allocation over space during two phases: a) closure periods of the managed area; b) 
open periods of the managed area. 
 
 Figure 4 graphically illustrates the relationship between fishing effort (number of 
trips) and catch-per-unit-effort (CPUE). The figure shows that despite the high number of 
fishing trips to Zone 3 and the managed areas, a relatively stable harvest of shells per 
person is maintained across all sites. However, the average CPUE is slightly higher in 
these two zones compared with Zones 1 and 2 with statistically significant differences 
(Table 1). This relationship between effort and CPUE suggests that Zone 3 (like the 
managed areas) is more productive and able to withstand a higher fishing effort than the 
other two zones. However, like Figure 3, this figure also fails to explain why less 
productive areas in Zones 1 and 2 are harvested and by whom.  
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Figure 4. Relationship between fishing effort and CPUE in Isla Costa Rica. * Note that only the most 
popular sites with three or more trips are presented. 
 
Figure 5 shows the fishing effort allocation by individuals, illustrating that certain 
fishers habitually harvest from the same zones, even if they are not the most productive 
(Figure 5). Each individual was color-coded in three primary colors according to his 
apparent “preference” from the data (or zone associated with his highest frequency of 
trips over time). These apparent preferences for certain areas correlated with their stated 
preferences in interviews (n=20). The 13 fishers with the highest frequency of trips to 
Zone 3 were coded blue; the four who prefer Zone 2 were coded red; and one who 
preferred Zone 1 was coded yellow. Individuals who harvest from two or more zones 
with relatively equal frequencies were coded their respective secondary colors, orange 
(Zones 1 and 2), green (Zones 1 and 3), and purple (Zones 2 and 3). The three people 
who harvest managed areas almost exclusively were coded white. To explain these 
apparent preferences, the following sections turn to the ethnographic data.  
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Figure 5: Individual differentiation in fishing effort allocation over space from Jan – Jun 2010 
 
Since preferences for resource space are not unique to Isla Costa Rica, Table 2 
summarizes responses from interviews in all four study areas. Free responses were coded 
and quantified in the table. The categories are not mutually exclusive since the questions 
were open-ended. Common reasons included: “more shells” (n=41), “bigger shells” 
(n=22), or “closer” (n=15). When I left the question more open-ended, some people 
responded similarly, but other explanations emerged, such as, “estoy enseñado” or “I am 
used to going there” or “allí cojo,” or literally “that’s (the spot) I get.” I also heard “it’s 
my area” and “it’s where I always get shells.” A cockle collector from Muisne summed 
up what I heard from many others: “todos cogen su rutina” or “everyone makes their own 
routine.” Those who did not have specific reasons for frequenting certain gathering 
grounds suggested they go wherever the boat takes them alone, with their family, or 
group of friends. The 10% (n=146) that did not have favorite spots typically responded 
this way—that “all the gathering grounds are the same.” Further discussions during the 
focus groups revealed other insights into how these customary norms may have 
developed over time. Some people commented on ecological conditions and how they 
typically avoid areas where the mud is too soft or too hard. Others expressed their 
knowledge about the relationship between shell size and ecological conditions (i.e. small 
shells from soft mud and larger shells from harder substrate, or in the préstamos along 
shrimp pond walls).  
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Table 2. Response categories explaining site preferences from interviews (n=146).  
 
Response 
category  Number Explanation  
________________________________________________________________________ 
More shells 41 More shells. One can harvest them faster and return home quicker. 
Bigger 
Shells 22 
Bigger shells. Some explained the reason for this is because there is 
less competition in these areas.  
 
 
"Enseñado" 19 
 
“That's where I always go" or "that's my area" or "that's where 
everyone goes." They have been going there since childhood and it 
was where their relatives, friends, or "their ancestors" showed them.  
Closer 15 
Those who liked to work close to home did not like paying for the trip 
(usually $1-2 depending on the distance).  
Boat brings 
us there 14 
"That's where we always go" (Isla Costa Rica) or "wherever they take 
me" (Puerto Hualtaco). 
 
Preferred 
sites not 
viable 13 
Preferred gathering grounds were no longer viable or accessible 
because of shrimp farms, custodias, too much competition, or 
overexploitation. 
Ecological 
reason 9 
Includes explanations like, "larger areas" or "better habitat for cockles" 
or they find the substrate easier gather shells quickly.  
Company 6 Depends. They go wherever the others go. 
No reason 4 Did not know why they preferred the areas they cited. 
Safer 1 (Isla Costa Rica) Safer from piracy or other malicious people. 
Other 4 "I like to go where few others go" or "few outsiders."  
No 
preference 13 
 
“All sites are the same” and they go "everywhere," "different places," 
or "wherever they take me." "We alternate among cockle beds 
depending on the tidal period." "You go to your site and search for 
cockles. If someone else is already there, you move on."  
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Caption: * Note categories are not mutually exclusive. 
 
Discussion 
 
Collecting Cockles in the Mangrove Margins  
In a day’s work, many cockle fishers secure their rubber boots and gloves, bundle 
their bodies and heads in clothing, and arm themselves with mosquito repellent to protect 
against the hot sun or cold rain and wind, aggressive insects, biting snakes, and stinging 
fish that burrow in the mud. A net bag called a jicra is used in El Oro to gather the shells 
while in Muisne, cockle collectors use anything from traditional gathering baskets to 
buckets, plastic bags, half soda bottles, their pockets, or their boots. The faena (work 
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period) usually lasts about three hours for most, but many cockle collectors work until 
they “completar,” or reach a rounded number of 25, 50, or 100 shells, depending on their 
goal for the day, level of skill, and luck. After finding a suitable patch and enduring a 
crouched position as they weave through a thicket of low-lying branches, maneuvering 
over and around the prop roots, or sinking in thigh-deep mud, the collector will have 
gathered anywhere between five to 250 shells that sell for $7-22 per 100 shells, 
depending on the province.  In El Oro, cockles sell for $12-22/100 depending on quality 
(size of shells). In Esmeraldas, shells sell for $7-12/100. Prices increase when demand is 
highest during Easter and Christmas holidays when Ecuadorians flock to the beaches and 
demand traditional coastal cuisine.  
Tides play a key role in decisions about where and when to fish, and for how 
long. In Isla Costa Rica, gill-net fishing is usually done during high tides and cockle 
collecting during low tides. Some men do both activities while others are dedicated 
exclusively to cockle collecting. As one man commented, “our whole way of life here on 
the island is dictated by the tides.”8 Spring tides (full moon) and neap tides (new moon) 
alternate on a cycle of eight-day periods. The larger swell of spring tides is associated 
with a longer lag time between rising and falling tides. This allows collectors to reach 
areas normally submerged during neap tides or travel further out into areas with less 
harvesting pressure. The lunar cycle and tidal periods also influence decisions about 
cockle collecting in Esmeraldas. People in Muisne refer to spring tides as “agua buena,” 
or “good water,” and neap tides as “agua mala,” or “bad water” when many cockle 
collectors decide to stay home or dedicate their time to other livelihood strategies. Those 
who decide to collect cockles during the shorter “agua mala” period usually stay close to 
the community.  
In addition to the lunar cycle and tidal periods, seasonal cockle collecting and 
daily fluctuations in the fishing effort might also reflect conditions of the broader 
economic context. The increase in prices during holidays provides incentives for part-
time cockle collectors who typically prefer other livelihood strategies. Some researchers 
have noted that the cockle fishery may be a last resort when other jobs are not available 
(Ocampo-Thomason 2006; Velásquez Runk et al. 2007). Others have asserted a social 
stigma is associated with cockle collecting in Ecuador (Kuhl and Sheridan 2009). 
However, for many cockle fishers, it is a resource that can be harvested year-round with 
reliable returns, thereby ensuring more income security than other small-scale fisheries 
that require investments in gear or specialized knowledge. Similar to other studies of 
fishermen (McGoodwin 1990; Griffith and Valdés Pizzini 2002), many cockle collectors 
in Ecuador prefer the freedom of fishing and collecting cockles over being “peons” in 
wage-labor positions. For some, particularly in the smaller communities and among 
members of local fishing associations, there is a great sense of pride and job satisfaction. 
 
Division of Space: Territoriality versus Mutual Respect  
Throughout much of the Ecuadorian coast, the mangrove cockle fishery is open-
access operating on a first-come, first-serve basis. The social division of space in the 
open-access areas around Isla Costa Rica reflects an informal system of mutual respect 
among members of the community and outsiders from Hualtaco, similar to other small-
scale fisheries in Mexico (McGoodwin 1994) and the Atlantic Forest in Brazil (Begossi 
                                                 
8 All quotations are my translations from Spanish. 
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1995; Begossi 2001). For example, despite their proximity to the community, certain 
cockle beds in Zone 2 were cited as preferred spots by people in Hualtaco and frequented 
less by collectors in Isla Costa Rica (see Table 1). One explanation for this mutual respect 
is that many fishers in Hualtaco are distant relatives whose families have migrated to the 
port in the last 50 years. This social system of cordial relations among fishers from 
different communities is further maintained through membership of many local 
associations to larger provincial and national federations of fishing associations. For 
example, when the Asociación Isla Costa Rica celebrated their ten-year anniversary 
during my residency in November of 2009, they invited several associations from 
Hualtaco, friends and relatives from neighboring communities, and employees on local 
shrimp farms to join in the festivities consisting of soccer matches by day and dancing, 
eating, and drinking into the night.  
On the other hand, many cockle collectors from Hualtaco and Isla Costa Rica 
reported defensive behavior among fishers in the community of Las Huacas (adjacent to 
Isla Costa Rica), similar to territoriality in Maine’s lobster fishery (Acheson 1987, 1975).  
Stories abound about violent confrontations with fishers from Las Huacas often described 
as “mean” and “criminal-like.” Men from Las Huacas are infamous for beating those who 
trespass into their areas; they confiscate their catches and sometimes steal their personal 
belongings like jicras, caps, money, wristwatches, or jewelry. Informants in Muisne also 
relayed similar accounts of confrontations with people from Las Manchas who have a 
reputation of threatening outsiders with machetes, a claim the people from Las Manchas 
do not deny. However, territorial behavior may be unique to only certain communities 
and not generalizable to the entire Ecuadorian cockle fishery. For the most part, cockle 
collectors in Ecuador are non-confrontational and with the exception of the new 
custodias, the fishery is characterized as a free-for-all in which fishing space is divided 
among individuals who are enseñados to their customary grounds. For example, if a 
cockle collector arrives at a site that someone else has gotten first, he might feel agitated, 
but there is not much he can do other than simply accept it and think to himself, “me 
ganó el puesto” or “he beat me to it” before moving on to a different area.  
 
Becoming Enseñado: The Social Production of Fishing Space 
This research shows that a higher fishing effort correlates with a higher CPUE, 
consistent with the predictions of optimal foraging theories and patch time allocation 
models (Sosis 2002; Chimello de Oliveira and Begossi 2011; Aswani 1998; Thomas 
2007). However, further analysis of individual differentiation over the same space reveals 
that the same set of individuals habitually harvest less productive areas as spaces they 
have claimed as “their own.” These findings signal that not all fishers are driven by 
optimizing tendencies, as also suggested by other researchers (Guest 2003; van 
Oostenbrugge et al. 2004; Teh et al. 2012). In contrast, preferences for less productive 
spots have been shaped by habitual use and the development of intimate knowledge about 
certain areas. In other words, habit, traditions, kinship and friendship networks, the 
organization of labor, access, and ecological reasons other than actual CPUE influence 
decisions about where to fish in the Ecuadorian cockle fishery. The notion of being 
“ensenado” or “used to” certain areas explains not only why less productive cockle beds 
are harvested, but also why those areas are harvested by the same individuals every time.  
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People become habituated to certain areas for several reasons. The most common 
explanation is that one becomes enseñado after harvesting the same grounds for many 
years. As many cockle collectors in all four study areas explained, “it’s where I (or we) 
have always gone” or “that’s where everyone goes.” Sometimes a fisher may claim to 
have discovered those areas on his own, but more often, fishers explain they have long 
harvested those areas in the footsteps of their forefathers, parents, grandparents, other 
relatives, or a friends with whom they most prefer to fish. In Isla Costa Rica, the 
mangrove areas in Zone 3 are described as “more extensive” and a “better habitat” (for 
cockles), even though the shells may be smaller in size. By comparison, other extensive 
mangrove areas in Zone 2 are dominated by mangrove crabs (Ucides occidentales), 
which few fishers in Isla Costa Rica harvest for market. Thus, cockle beds in Zone 3 are 
perceived as more abundant and productive, “constant and secure,” and “far enough from 
the port that there is less competition” with outsiders. Similar to Basurto’s (2008) 
observations, these perceptions guide individuals in their daily decisions and interactions 
with fishery resources. Furthermore, since Zone 3 is officially part of the association’s 
custodia, many people from Hualtaco respect the boundaries. People from Isla Costa Rica 
say that their forefathers have always harvested Zone 3, which allowed them to 
incorporate these areas into their legal custodia during their negotiations with the 
government in 2000.  
Another way one becomes enseñado is through regular use as they follow their 
friends and family or join the passenger boat in a daily routine. Boat captains in Isla 
Costa Rica carry groups of 10-15 cockle collectors to Zone 3, which is another reason 
why the fishing effort is significantly higher than sites closer to the community. The cost 
of the trip is $1-2 and a few people prefer not to pay and instead travel on foot to sites 
nearer the community. Some collectors prefer to work alone “without the distraction of 
conversation” thereby avoiding the larger groups who travel together to their respective 
gathering grounds. When I asked people who predominantly harvest shells from Zone 2, 
they commented that “only a few of us know those areas” and “I know those areas,” 
which allows them to harvest successfully. It is not clear whether people become 
enseñado to certain areas because of their actual success or whether the perception of 
success grows out of the process of becoming enseñado. What is clear is that very few 
cockle collectors in all four study areas say that they have no preference at all.  
 
Knowledge, Timing, Rotation, and Fishery Sustainability  
 The implication of becoming enseñado is that fishers gain intimate knowledge 
about their areas: the locations of the best spots, when they were harvested last, who else 
is harvesting them and how often, and whether the others harvest in a sustainable manner. 
Since the direction of the relationship between knowledge and perceptions of success is 
not clear, resource space preferences may be partially explained by Bourdieu’s notion of 
habitus, or the everyday practice of individuals by which knowledge is encoded in both 
cognitive and behavioral interactions with social and biophysical structures of the 
external world (Bourdieu 1977: 78-87). In other words, the dynamic production and 
reproduction of local ecological knowledge is reinforced through reciprocal feedback 
between knowledge and action in everyday practice.  
Rotation of cockle beds is key to fishery productivity and stability. Many 
collectors alternate among a set of preferred spots to which they are enseñado. According 
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to customary knowledge, two weeks is sufficient time for a cockle bed to regenerate a 
supply of shells for the next harvest, illustrating also the importance of the lunar cycle as 
a guide for timing the rotation, as observed by other ethnographers in Brazil (Cordell 
1974). With each harvest, small shells are often left behind to promote propagation and 
spawning. Over generations, this local knowledge is passed down from one generation to 
the next and often reinforced in workshops sponsored by biologists from NGOs and 
government organizations. The fishery-managed areas of the custodia represent an 
institutionalized effort to regulate rotation among cockle beds to ensure sustainability. 
During the ten-day open period, the other cockle beds are given time to recuperate. 
Because of their perceived productivity, many fishers abandon their other livelihood 
activities to harvest almost exclusively from the managed areas, resulting in a higher 
effort allocation than all the other zones. On the other hand, the managed areas are able to 
withstand a higher fishing effort than open-access areas (Beitl 2011).   
 Local ecological knowledge about cockles may contribute to fisher success 
(García-Quijano 2009) and temporal stability of the fishery (Begossi 2006), but whether 
such practices represent intentional or incidental conservation is beyond the scope of this 
study (see Pollnac and Johnson 2005; Ruttan 1998). On the other hand, many cockle 
collectors do seem to have some sort of conservation ethic. For example, experienced 
cockle collectors say that it is not necessary to plow through the mud “with two hands” or 
use a machete to scrape or cut the mangrove roots in order to find shells. A good cockle 
collector will leave the mud relatively undisturbed, neatly inserting his/her hands through 
the small holes that suggest there is life below the mud. While many informants have 
suggested this knowledge does not take a long time to develop, others expressed concern 
that encroaching outsiders are responsible for destructive harvesting practices, 
particularly in small communities like Isla Costa Rica and Las Manchas. Such suspicions 
about outsiders have also been noted in the communities around San Lorenzo on the 
Colombian border (Ocampo-Thomason 2006).   
Just as a cockle fisher becomes enseñado to certain areas and fishing companions, 
he/ she also becomes habituated to ecological conditions that differentiate cockle beds. 
For example, the consistency of the mud or the density of the mangrove branches and 
roots affect the relative ease and ability for some collectors to gather shells successfully. 
Some people prefer the harder soils despite the dangers of cutting and scraping their 
hands on mangrove roots and decaying branches buried in the mud. Others prefer softer 
soils characteristic of younger mangrove colonies and abandoned shrimp farms, despite 
the danger of sinking up to one’s waist and losing a boot. One cockle fisher from Isla 
Costa Rica prefers to work in the préstamos, which refer to shrimp ponds walls. He 
believes that the effluents from the shrimp ponds nourish the filter-feeding cockles 
allowing his shells to grow quite large, even if his catch contains fewer shells than what 
others gather from Zone 3. He explains that he is “enseñado to harvesting larger shells.” 
Working predominantly in Zone 2 has enabled him to establish affable relations with the 
shrimp farmers who grant him special permission to harvest cockles from the mangrove 
stands that enclose the ponds.  
Finally, certain buyers of mangrove cockles also become enseñado to purchasing 
catches of a particular quality. Even though shells sell by the number and not by the size 
or weight, some buyers prefer to purchase catches considered “good quality,” referring to 
the average size of shells and proportion of A. tuberculosa in the catch. Moreover, the 
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negotiation largely depends on the relationship between cockle collectors and their 
buyers. Some cockle fishers sell their catch to the same buyer every time (usually a friend 
or relative). Others reported in the interviews that they negotiate with multiple buyers 
before making their sale, although my observations suggest that this practice is less 
common. In sum, larger catches do not always signify more profitable economic returns 
for all fishers (Van Holt 2012). Furthermore, economics is not the main driver of resource 
space preferences or fishing behavior.  
 
Adaptive Challenges and Resilience in Mangrove-Associated Fisheries 
 Like many small-scale fisheries, several challenges confront the sustainability of 
Ecuador’s mangrove-associated fisheries. Many cockle collectors have expressed 
concerns about increasing competition, encroachment by outsiders (highlanders, 
foreigners, or other communities), enclosure by shrimp farming or custodias, and 
pollution (urban contamination or shrimp farm discharge). Some fishers claim they have 
been displaced by these processes. As each fisher has a set of his/her own preferred 
gathering grounds, he/she is able to calculate a timely resting period to ensure the 
sustainable exploitation of particular spots. However, many fishers are worried that no 
one leaves the sites to rest as long as they should anymore. Furthermore, the timely 
rotation among gathering grounds is more challenging to coordinate in large communities 
like Muisne and Hualtaco where competition in a free-for-all is higher. Climate change 
may pose further challenges to fishery stability as the wet, rainy seasons associated with 
cockle spawning grow shorter. 
Shrimp farms have displaced many fishers from their preferred spots since the 
1980s and continue to contribute to other annoyances that make cockle collecting more 
difficult and dangerous. In addition to occasional confrontations between shrimp farmers 
and fishers, many people in Muisne complain about “pica pica,” a skin irritation 
associated with a particular kind of algae found around shrimp ponds. Other fishers in 
Muisne believe that the venomous fish they call “peje sapo” is more abundant in the mud 
around shrimp farms. Environmentally, shrimp farms have disrupted the hydrology of the 
estuaries, making some areas impassable by motorboat and changing the consistency of 
the mud in gathering grounds. Shrimp aquaculture is also associated with occasional fish 
kills and other pollutants that may affect biological processes of settlement and growth of 
cockle larvae.  
In the future, many cockle collectors may leave the fishery to pursue other 
livelihood strategies. Livelihood switching and “occupational pluralism” is common in 
many fisheries around the world, despite the immense sense of pride and job satisfaction 
that many fishers have (McCay 1978; Griffith and Valdés Pizzini 2002; McGoodwin 
1990). A reduced fishing effort has many implications for fishery sustainability. For 
example, other research has shown a positive relationship between migration and catch 
rates (Hamilton et al. 2004).  
On the other hand, an unwillingness or inability to leave the fishery (Teh et al. 
2012) or a strong sense of pride or identity as a fisher might restrict people’s ability to be 
resilient and adaptive in the face of broader social and environmental change (Coulthard 
2008). This does not necessarily suggest fishery stability is threatened. Ecuador’s recent 
policy changes in favor of mangrove conservation, its history of activism, and 
international attention to social justice by organizations like Greenpeace may all 
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contribute to increased mangrove restoration in the years to come. Newly constructed 
ancestral identities and a new “sense of peoplehood” offer a promise of empowerment for 
mangrove users whose life has been previously undervalued (Latorre 2012, 2014). These 
processes may have deepened the sense of pride among many cockle fishers as “ancestral 
users of mangroves.” Because of this, many cockle collectors hope to protect mangroves 
and fishery-based livelihoods so they may pass the traditions down to their children. A 
longitudinal research design is needed to assess how such livelihood decisions affect 
fishery resilience and how environmental changes, in turn, affect the spatial allocation of 
fishing effort. Such future research would contribute considerably to understanding about 
fisheries as complex adaptive systems (Mahon et al. 2008; Wilson et al. 2013a; Wilson et 
al. 2013b; Daw et al. 2012).  
 
Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper was to explain patterns in fishing effort allocation as a 
response to cultural and environmental factors that influence resource space preferences. 
This research addresses a methodological gap in the literature on folk management 
identified by Pollnac and Johnson (2005) and contributes to understanding about the 
social production of fishing space. While small-scale fisheries are highly dynamic and 
often characterized by livelihood switching, the targeting of multiple species, and 
uncertainty about fisher decisions, the focus here on Ecuador’s cockle fishery has 
controlled for some of the complexity, allowing for a more nuanced, in-depth analysis of 
the cultural factors influencing fishing effort allocation in the context of environmental 
change. This study builds on existing research on benthic fisheries (Basurto et al. 2013) 
and further contributes to qualitative understanding of fisheries as complex adaptive 
systems in which self-organization emerges out of individual decisions, adaptations, and 
learning (Wilson et al. 2013a; Wilson et al.2013b; Berkes et al. 2000).  
The use of GIS as a data management and analytical tool has many potential 
management applications (Aswani and Lauer 2006; St. Martin 2004). First, mapping 
customary use of fishing grounds could aid Ecuadorian communities that continue to 
witness the illegal encroachment of shrimp farms. Second, the approach used here may 
provide methodological guidelines for addressing issues raised by McClain and others 
(2013) concerning representation since the local community coordinated the data 
collection over a period of several months from a representative sample. This research 
should further be of interest to Ecuadorian regulatory agencies and research institutes like 
the INP as they face institutional constraints and other challenges to understanding the 
complexity of artisanal fisheries, which support thousands of livelihoods in coastal 
Ecuador.  Furthermore, the data gathered through this partnership with Asociación Isla 
Costa Rica represents a successful case of collaborative learning between researchers and 
resource users (St. Martin et al. 2007) and may serve as a model for research institutions 
with limited resources. It is hoped that the lessons learned from this research may be 
applicable to other small-scale fisheries throughout the developing world with limited 
institutional capacity for research.  
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